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Abstract
The single salary schedule has ruled the delivery of teacher pay for decades, despite long-standing criticism
that it fails to link some portion of teachers'pay to their performance. In recent years, there has been some
experimentation with performance pay for teachers. Early attempts focused on the development of merit pay,
in which pay raises were linked to subjective evaluations of teacher performance. Subsequent evaluations of
merit pay plans questioned their effectiveness, especially given their limited survival, though it was
acknowledged that the problem was not necessarily merit pay per se, but the way the plans were designed,
implemented, and administered (Hatry, Greiner, & Ashford, 1994). Notwithstanding these unsuccessful
experiences, national surveys have found that teacher attitudes toward some forms of performance pay are not
unfavorable (Ballou, 2001; Ballou & Podgursky, 1993).
In the 1990s, other forms of performance pay began to emerge at the state and district levels. Notable were
school-based performance awards and knowledge- and skill-based pay plans. Elements from these plans have
now been incorporated into combined pay plans. And while none of these plans has been widely adopted,
they have drawn intensive national scrutiny and study. This Policy Brief focuses on the nature and
effectiveness of these plans. We first provide generic descriptions of three types of plans, followed by a
synthesis of research results on their effectiveness. A set of guidelines for effective practice is then provided to
help states and districts embarking on these forms of performance pay. We conclude with a look ahead at
recent developments in performance pay plans and other deviations from the traditional teacher salary
schedule.
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Introduction
The single salary schedule has ruled the deliv-
ery of teacher pay for decades, despite long-stand-
ing criticism that it fails to link some portion of
teachers’pay to their performance. In recent years,
there has been some experimentation with perfor-
mance pay for teachers. Early attempts focused on
the development of merit pay, in which pay raises
were linked to subjective evaluations of teacher
performance. Subsequent evaluations of merit pay
plans questioned their effectiveness, especially
given their limited survival, though it was
acknowledged that the problem was not necessar-
ily merit pay per se, but the way the plans were
designed, implemented, and administered (Hatry,
Greiner, & Ashford, 1994). Notwithstanding these
unsuccessful experiences, national surveys have
found that teacher attitudes toward some forms of
performance pay are not unfavorable (Ballou,
2001; Ballou & Podgursky, 1993).
In the 1990s, other forms of performance pay
began to emerge at the state and district levels.
Notable were school-based performance awards
and knowledge- and skill-based pay plans. Ele-
ments from these plans have now been incorporat-
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ed into combined pay plans. And while none of
these plans has been widely adopted, they have
drawn intensive national scrutiny and study. This
Policy Brief focuses on the nature and effective-
ness of these plans. We first provide generic
descriptions of three types of plans, followed by a
synthesis of research results on their effectiveness.
A set of guidelines for effective practice is then
provided to help states and districts embarking on
these forms of performance pay. We conclude
with a look ahead at recent developments in per-
formance pay plans and other deviations from the
traditional teacher salary schedule.
Teacher Performance 
Pay Plans
What exactly constitutes a performance pay
plan for teachers? Our view is quite broad. We
define teacher performance pay as any systematic
process for measuring teacher behavior or results,
and linking these measurements to changes in
teacher pay. Indicators of teacher performance
may include improving professional skills, chang-
ing classroom behavior, and producing desired
outcomes.   Figure 1 illustrates our view.
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A teacher’s knowledge and skills are the basic
inputs that a teacher brings to the instructional
process.  These skills include knowledge of con-
tent and pedagogy, skill in assessment and class-
room management, and general abilities, atti-
tudes, and personality dispositions. Knowledge
and skills are assessed via testing, certification
(e.g., by the National Board for Professional
Teaching Standards) and classroom observation.
Since teacher knowledge and skills may need
upgrading to improve instruction, teacher perfor-
mance can be defined and measured in terms of
the teacher’s success in increasing the variety and
level of instructionally relevant knowledge and
skills. Pay can be increased accordingly. 
Classroom performance encompasses the
teacher’s actual instructional behavior (also called
teacher performance competence), and is typical-
ly measured by observations such as those done as
part of a teacher evaluation system. These mea-
surements can be linked with pay. Instructional
outcomes are at least partly a result of teacher
instruction, and  typically are assessed via tests of
student learning, and perhaps other measures like
attendance and graduation rates. Teacher perfor-
mance can be defined in terms of these outcomes,
and pay changes (e.g., bonuses) can be linked to
outcome measures. The actual impacts of teacher
knowledge and skill on teacher instructional
behavior, and of instruction on outcomes, are not
fully understood. While researchers work to better
specify these relationships, those responsible for
initiating and designing performance pay plans
must supplement the existing research with their
own intuition and experience to make reasonable
estimates about the likely impacts of rewarding
teachers for these three kinds of performance.
Teacher performance plans represent one
departure from the traditional teacher pay sched-
ule. Other kinds of departures include differentiat-
ed pay (e.g., more pay for mentor teachers or team
leaders), pay for teaching in hard-to-staff or high-
need schools, and incentives to attract and retain
teachers in shortage areas. It should be noted that
these systems also may require assessments of
teacher knowledge, skill, or performance.  Ensur-
ing that mentor teachers have the needed skills, or
that those teachers attracted to high-need schools
have the skills to help improve student achieve-
ment, are examples of where assessments may be
needed. Descriptions of performance pay plans
are shown in Table 1.
In school-based performance award programs,
performance is measured and awarded at the
school (as opposed to individual teacher) level.
Specific school-wide goals are established, and
bonuses are paid to teachers and other staff
according to the degree of goal attainment.
Knowledge- and skill-based pay plans measure
and reward individual teacher behaviors or com-
petencies thought to be linked to high-quality
teacher performance. Teachers receive bonuses or
increases in base salary for the acquisition of new
competencies, classroom performance mastery,
and certification by the National Board for Pro-
fessional Teaching Standards (NBPTS). A com-
bined plan contains elements of both of the above
plans, plus potentially other elements, such as pay
for measured growth in  student achievement. The
recently implemented Denver ProComp plan is an
example of a combined plan. It measures perfor-
mance in four areas (teacher knowledge and
skills, professional evaluation, market incentives,
and student growth). The single salary schedule is
eliminated. In its place is a base salary to which is
added specific amounts of performance pay in
each of the four areas.
Research Summary
Research evaluating the impacts of these pay
plans has been conducted at both state and district
sites across the country. The number of studies,
however, is very small, and few if any estimate the
effect of implementing a plan on student achieve-
ment. A synthesis of key research findings is
shown in Exhibit Four (school-based performance
awards), Exhibit Five (knowledge- and skill-based
pay), and Exhibit Six (combined plan) in Appen-
dix A. The findings focus on impacts on student
achievement (not always assessed), impacts on
teachers, and administrative and alignment prob-
lems. At the bottom of each exhibit are citations to
the research. The reader is encouraged to consult
the research for fuller descriptions of the research
sites and their plans, as well as methodology and
The research reported in this brief was conduct-
ed by the Consortium for Policy Research in
Education (CPRE) and funded by  the Institute of
Education Sciences, United States Department
of Education, under Grant No. R308A960003.
Opinions expressed in this Brief are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Institute of Education Sciences, the Unit-
ed States Department of Education, CPRE, or its
institutional members. 
3
Teacher Performance Pay: Synthesis of Plans, Research, and Guidelines for Practice
Table 1. Descriptions of Performance Pay Plans
Types of Performance Pay Plans Description
School-Based Performance Award • School-level performance pay plan.
• District or State establishes school-wide goals for student achievement 
(level or growth) and other performance indicators such as graduation,
Advanced Placement, and attendance rates.
• Goals are annual or multi-year and require performance maintenance or
improvement (relative to a base, relative to a standards, or value added).
• There are pre-determined bonus amounts and payout criteria.
• Bonuses paid to teachers and other staff, or into a school activity fund.
• Full bonus (typically $500-$1,500) is paid to teachers and administrators;
smaller (often half) bonus paid to other school staff.
• Single salary schedule remains intact.
Knowledge- and Skill-Based Pay • Base pay increase or bonus (typically $300-$3,000) for competency 
demonstration:
3 Skill blocks-technology, student assessment, curriculum unit 
design, etc.
3 Portfolio completion
3 Dual certification
3 Graduate degree in subject taught
• Base pay increase or bonus for classroom performance mastery 
(typically $1,000-$3,000):
3 Standards-based teacher evaluation
• Base pay increase or bonus for NBPTS certification 
(typically $1,000-$15,000)
• May involve changes to single salary schedule:
3 Fewer steps
3 Fewer or redefined lanes
3 Performance-linked career ladder progression
Combined Plan • Components from various types of plans are used.
• Denver ProComp Plan: Additional pay on top of salary index amount 
($34,200) for meeting the following requirements:
3 Knowledge and skills (up to $4,762)
n Professional development units
n Graduate degree/national certificates and license
n Tuition reimbursement
3 Standards-based teacher evaluation (up to $1,366)
3 Market incentives (up to $1,025)
n Hard-to-staff subjects and schools
3 Student growth (up to $2,052)
n Student success in meeting two annual learning objectives
n State test scores
n Distinguished school
• Funded in part by a $25 million voter referendum on the plan, not 
time-limited and inflation adjusted over time.
• Single salary schedule is replaced.
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measures, analysis, findings, and discussions of
limitations and implications. A recent brief
overview of research on performance pay plans,
as well as differentiated pay and recruitment and
retention incentives, may be found in Goldhaber
(2007).
School-based performance-award plans were
evaluated at several sites. It was found that in
addition to performance bonuses, teachers experi-
enced a large number of both positive and nega-
tive outcomes, and that both the size of the bonus
and the fairness of the bonus system were of crit-
ical importance to teachers. Another key finding
was that teachers’ expectancies that their own
efforts would help the school meet its perfor-
mance goals actually predicted whether the school
subsequently did so. This finding led us to con-
clude that districts need to provide teachers with
specific performance supports and resources to
help them meet goals, and that human resource
(HR) systems can directly aid in this effort. 
Research findings on knowledge- and skill-
based pay plans are varied, due to the number of
different types of plans evaluated. The competen-
cy demonstration plan in Douglas County, CO,
was generally well received by the teachers. How-
ever, teachers there reported difficulty in under-
standing the specific requirements and payouts,
and they were bothered by the preparation and
paperwork demands of the plan.  Teachers’ class-
room-performance mastery was studied exten-
sively under standards-based teacher evaluation
systems. In these systems teacher evaluation is
based on a performance competency model, such
as Danielson’s (1996) Framework for Teaching.
Key findings were that teachers accepted the per-
formance competencies (teaching standards)
underlying the plan, and that ratings of teachers’
classroom performance on these competencies
were predictive of value-added student learning in
reading and math. Teachers were bothered by a
lack of procedural knowledge about the system
and also by the many implementation glitches that
occurred. It also was found that the systems were
designed and implemented as “stand-alone” sys-
tems, were not linked to a broader district strategy
of performance improvement or to HR systems,
and did not apply to principals and other adminis-
trators. With one exception, teachers subsequently
resisted and rejected efforts to link evaluations to
pay raises. Certification by the NBPTS just
recently has come under research scrutiny. Results
suggest that certified teachers do, on the average,
have students with higher value-added student
achievement. High payouts to certified teachers
have raised questions about the cost-effectiveness
of certification.
Combined plans are in their infancy, with little
relevant research. An exception is a partial evalu-
ation of a pilot of the Denver ProComp plan. The
evaluation focused on  the student growth compo-
nent. It was found that the quality of the two learn-
ing objectives each teacher was required to set did
relate to the percentage of students meeting learn-
ing goals. Teacher reactions were mixed, with
favorable reports about the focus on student
achievement, but concerns about fairness, trust in
the system, and the performance reviews conduct-
ed by principals. As with the other plans, prob-
lems of alignment (including with HR guidelines)
were large and posed a major hindrance. 
The overall conclusion that emerges from
these studies is that performance pay plans have
met with some, but limited, initial success. Evi-
dence of a substantial positive impact on either
student achievement or teacher performance is
lacking, and teachers report a wide variety of both
positive and negative reactions to local plans. Is
the mixed evidence a reflection of inherent and
immutable flaws in performance pay for teachers,
or is it more a matter of how the plans have been
designed, implemented, and managed? We think
the latter is more plausible. Accordingly, we next
provide a set of guidelines for policy and practice
to help states and districts do a better job of using
teacher performance pay. It should be noted that
the suggestions call for major changes in practice;
the suggestions are not for those with faint vision,
will, skill, or budget.
Guidelines for Policy 
and Practice
Results of the research surveyed above, cou-
pled with our own extensive field experience in
conducting research and analyzing state and dis-
trict actions and problems, lead us to offer the fol-
lowing guidelines for policy and practice. While
we acknowledge the limited number of studies
underlying these recommendations, we think
these guidelines will provide a useful starting
point for those embarking on the design and
implementation of a performance pay plan for
teachers. These guidelines are a synthesis of sug-
gestions we have made previously (Heneman III,
Milanowski, Kimball & Odden, 2006; Kelley,
Odden, Milanowski & Heneman III, 2000;
Odden, Kelley, Heneman III, & Milanowski,
2001).
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achievement, value-added learning). Whatever its
exact nature it is wise to ensure that the measure-
ment system delivers reliable performance data.
Using inaccurate, delayed, or difficult-to-retrieve
performance data will undermine the plan's fair-
ness and threaten its survival. A related measure-
ment-system matter involves building databases
that link teachers to the schools they teach in, their
students, subjects taught, performance evaluation
results, seniority, and professional-development
accomplishments. The need for such an integrated
human-resources information system has become
obvious to many states and districts, especially to
support a total performance improvement strategy
and alignment of human resources.
Gauge Likely Teacher Reactions 
to the Performance Pay Plan
Teachers have multiple reactions to perfor-
mance pay plans, based both on their experiences
and on plan design features. Our research shows
that it is important to gauge reactions in four
areas: differentiation, performance motivation,
fairness, and acceptance.
A. Differentiation
The single-salary schedule has been the pay
delivery mechanism for decades, and teachers
view it as the accepted and fair method of com-
pensation (Odden & Kelley, 2002). Within the sin-
gle-salary schedule, there are only two types of
differentiation among teachers: seniority and edu-
cational credits. Both criteria are viewed as objec-
tive and have been inculcated into teachers as
legitimate bases for determining their pay. Intro-
duction of performance as an additional basis of
differentiation often is viewed as threatening since
it signals a focus on a new criterion—actual per-
formance.
Consequently, states and districts must gauge
whether teachers are ready for performance-based
pay differentiation. Readiness must be gauged in
terms of  teachers' views on the viability of per-
formance pay in both principle and practice.
Lacking clear signs of readiness, there will need
to be extensive discussions with teachers about
the viability of a performance pay plan prior to its
introduction. It may be necessary to exempt cer-
tain teachers (e.g., more senior ones) from partic-
ipating in the new pay plan. Alternatively, the bar-
riers to acceptance may be so high that pursuit of
performance pay may be in vain.
Prerequisites for 
a Performance Pay Plan 
Guarantee Stable and Adequate Funding
Stable and adequate funding of the new pro-
gram is an absolute necessity. Without it the pro-
gram likely will not get off the ground, or if it
manages to do so, will fade away. Teachers are
suspicious of performance pay because of funding
questions and often are unwilling to buy into the
program and respond positively because of this
skepticism. The funding need not be an external
infusion of new dollars; funding also can come
about internally through a combination of
resource reallocation, veteran teacher attrition (to
be replaced with less costly novices), and reduced
backloading of the single salary schedule (Odden
& Wallace, 2007). 
Provide Competitive Total Compensation
The total compensation package for teachers
comprises salary, benefits, and performance pay
(if any). Since performance pay likely will be a
relatively small component of total compensation,
the burden will continue to fall on salary and ben-
efits to meet the market test of being strong
enough to attract and retain sufficient numbers of
highly qualified teachers (Odden & Wallace,
2006). The salary and benefit package must be
competitive before embarking on a performance
pay program. It is fruitless and self-defeating to
build a performance pay plan atop noncompetitive
salaries and benefits. It also is important not to
overlook high-cost benefits such as pensions
when assessing  competitiveness. Pensions have
the potential to be used successfully for attraction
and retention purposes, despite current roadblocks
to such use (Kimball, Heneman III, & Kellor,
2005).
Build Strong Measurement Systems
A performance pay plan requires, and is dri-
ven by, a performance measurement system. The
system must provide reliable, valid performance
scores, as well as other information useful for
judging and guiding performance improvement.
In some instances, the measurement system is
straightforward, such as recording whether a
teacher has completed a professional-develop-
ment activity or obtained a certification. More
likely, however, the system will be more complex,
requiring assessments of classroom performance
(e.g., standards-based teacher evaluation) or
assessments of student performance (e.g., student
6
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To effectively motivate efforts to improve per-
formance, pay differentiation must continue over
time. Research suggests, however, that it does not.
Over time, teachers exert pressure to lower per-
formance standards increasing the number of
teachers who become eligible for performance
pay (Hartry et al, 1994; Murnane and Cohen,
1986). While such an eventuality may enhance
acceptance of the plan, it also drives up costs, cre-
ating long-term funding issues. If performance
standards are to be maintained, the number of
teachers eligible may have to be limited or the size
of the payouts reduced-either of which would
raise teacher acceptance issues.    
B. Teacher Motivation
A performance pay plan seeks to motivate
teachers to focus on and exert effort toward
desired behaviors and outcomes. Therefore, it is
important to assess the extent to which the perfor-
mance pay plan is consistent with accepted prin-
ciples of employee motivation (Lawler, 1990;
Odden & Kelley, 2002). Three principles are crit-
ical:
1. Teachers must value the reward. The
form (i.e., base-pay increase or bonus) and
amount of performance pay must be sufficient to
motivate teachers to seek it. Relatively small
salary increases or bonuses (less than 2 percent of
base pay) will not work. Performance-pay plans
should not be built on trifling amounts of financial
reward. 
It should be remembered that any performance
pay plan will create numerous ancillary rewards
and penalties, referred to collectively as “working
conditions.” These include a sense of goal accom-
plishment, feedback and assistance toward
improvement, teacher and student learning, stress,
and sanctions. Examples of these are shown in
Exhibits 2 and 4. Studies of teacher satisfaction
and turnover indicate that other important rewards
or penalties associated with teaching include
opportunities for leadership experience, level of
cooperation among teachers, availability of mate-
rials and resources, level of student misconduct
and discipline, and teacher participation in deci-
sion-making (Ingersoll, 2001). Thus, the total
reward environment must be judged to determine
if it is, on balance, a positively rewarding one that
teachers will seek out and remain in.
2. Teachers must see the performance-pay
link. Often referred to as “line of sight,” teachers
must recognize and understand the connection
between their performance and their pay. The link
is expressed in a payout formula. In some cases
the link is straightforward, such as a $500 bonus
for completion of a skill block, and the line of
sight is clear. In other cases, the payout formula is
complex, clouding the line of sight. In common
goal plans, for example, the payout formula may
be difficult to understand due to the use of multi-
ple performance indicators, differential weighting
of the indicators, and more than one performance
level warranting some amount of performance
pay. It is important to gauge whether the payout
formula is understandable, and whether there is
adequate communication with teachers. The Den-
ver ProComp plan is excellent in this regard since
it has on its website (denverprocomp.org) a salary
calculator that teachers can use to calculate the
payouts they would receive for various accom-
plishments.
3. Teachers must see an effort-performance
link. Often referred to as teacher expectancy, this
link is a subjective one in which teachers judge
the probability that a focused, intensive effort on
their part will result in the desired performance.
Many factors can potentially thwart teacher
expectancies. Examples include very difficult per-
formance goals, nonspecific performance ratings,
lack of resources to support strong effort, inade-
quate performance management (performance
planning, observation, evaluation, feedback,
coaching) by principals, inadequate and unfo-
cused professional development, and unmotivated
students. The performance pay plan must be
assessed in terms of the presence of such road-
blocks and whether they can be overcome in the
design of the system prior to its adoption. The per-
formance pay plan must provide teachers every
possible opportunity to be successful in their per-
formance.
C. Fairness
Teachers’ sense of the performance pay plan’s
fairness is an essential ingredient for acceptance.
At a minimum, the issue of fairness can be divid-
ed into distributive and procedural components.
Distributive fairness refers to whether the form,
amount, and formula for the payout are perceived
to be fair. Procedural fairness represents teachers’
feelings about how the plan is implemented and
administered. Fairness perceptions may also be
more specific and focused on particular elements
of the plan, such as the performance measurement
system, the performance management practices of
the principal, and the supports that are provided to
teachers to enhance their performance. What evi-
dence is there that teachers perceive the program
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to be fair? This is a critical question to ask of any
performance pay plan.
D. Acceptance
Ultimately, teachers must come to accept the
plan. Acceptance represents a willingness to work
within the plan, follow its procedures, trust
administrators and teacher association leaders,
seek out ways to improve performance, experi-
ence a satisfying work environment, and remain in
one’s job (Heneman & Milanowski, 2001).
Teacher acceptance ultimately will determine the
effectiveness and survival of the performance pay
plan. Teachers’ judgments about differentiation,
motivation, and fairness will contribute heavily to
decisions about whether or not to accept the plan.
Both initial and continued acceptance are like-
ly to be problematic. In Cincinnati, teachers over-
whelming voted to reject linking a standards-
based teacher evaluation to a jointly designed per-
formance pay plan, and to oust the union leader
who championed the new plan. Even the carefully
crafted Denver ProComp plan received less than
60 percent vote approval from teachers, and only
about 30 percent of eligible teachers opted in dur-
ing the first two annual opt-in periods. And in
Kentucky, resistance from the state teachers’ asso-
ciation led to the elimination of bonuses that were
part of a state-wide school-based performance
award program. At the Vaughan Charter School in
Los Angeles, the performance pay plan survived,
but initial teacher acceptance was low until teach-
ers’ concerns about fairness and performance
feedback were addressed and the number of
senior teachers shrunk due to turnover. In short,
continued acceptance and survival of perfor-
mance-pay plans may be problematic, as was the
case with merit pay plans (Hartry et al, 1994;
Murnane and Cohen, 1986). 
Designing 
the Performance Pay Plan
Include Principals and Administrators
It is an anomaly that proposals for perfor-
mance pay for teachers rarely suggest inclusion of
principals, administrators, and superintendents.
Their exclusion sends many unfortunate signals to
teachers, one being that the burden of making
improvements falls solely on their shoulders, and
that principals and administrators are exempt from
the need to be effective performance managers of
their teachers. A performance pay plan is really a
performance improvement plan, and it should
include all of those responsible for improving per-
formance. There should be a performance man-
agement chain throughout the instructional hierar-
chy, with the performance pay plan but a single
(albeit critical) component of the improvement
plan.
Develop a Performance Improvement
Strategy and Plan
As noted, a performance pay plan should be
embedded within a broader strategy to improve
the schools. The linking of performance results to
pay is insufficient to drive performance improve-
ment. The part of the improvement plan that is of
relevance here pertains to teachers, specifically
the need to remove roadblocks to their individual
improvement and to provide them with perfor-
mance enablers, the enablers being actions and
programs that facilitate the development and use
of new knowledge and skills that will help teach-
ers deliver higher performance. Examples include
professional development, mentoring, profession-
al learning communities, and feedback and coach-
ing. Such enablers foster a higher expectancy of
achieving good results and thus motivation to
improve performance.
Align Human Resource Systems 
to Performance Improvement
Many of the drivers of teacher performance
improvement reside within the Human Resources
(HR) domain (Heneman & Milanowski, 2004).
Indeed, there are eight major HR practice areas,
and each area has components that can be aligned
with a teacher performance improvement plan.
The eight HR practice areas are teacher recruit-
ment, selection, induction, mentoring, profession-
al development, compensation, performance man-
agement, and instructional leadership. Each of
these areas must focus the content of its programs
on the knowledge, skills, and performance com-
petencies that teachers need to be successful in the
classroom. During recruitment and selection, for
example, desired performance competencies can
be identified, sought, and assessed in job candi-
dates. In induction and mentoring, teachers can
receive targeted information and assistance from
other teachers centered around the performance
competencies. Professional development can be
revamped so that only courses and in-service
activities that address the performance competen-
cies are offered and “count” toward movement on
the single salary schedule. In the compensation
area, the district can offer various sweeteners (hir-
ing bonuses, relocation assistance, higher place-
ment on the salary schedule) for candidates with
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exceptional competencies. Performance manage-
ment practices by principals can be honed to help
teachers improve via better performance planning,
observation and evaluation, and feedback and
coaching. Finally, instructional leaders them-
selves should be selected and trained on the basis
of their competencies in managing teacher perfor-
mance, and should be held accountable for their
performance. In these myriad ways, HR practices
can be aligned around teacher performance and
become an important component of an overall
strategy to improve teacher performance.
Engage the Teachers’ Association
Active engagement of the teachers’ associa-
tion is not only legally necessary, but desirable in
a practical sense. In myriad ways the association
can prove helpful in preparing teachers for perfor-
mance improvement, and for pay plan design,
implementation, communication, follow through,
and revision. The teachers’ association can thus
function as a performance enabler for teachers. It
appears that most performance pay plans are
designed and piloted outside the normal bargain-
ing process, a practice we have experienced and
endorse. This approach, it should be noted, may
require a special memorandum of understanding,
special design and implementation teams, and
joint communication activities.
Build Capacity
It is our experience that teachers, administra-
tors, and teacher association leaders lack the nec-
essary knowledge and skills to effectively design
and implement performance pay plans. This is
understandable, given the decades-long reliance
on the single salary schedule. For those who
“grew up” under the traditional pay plan, nothing
in their experience would prepare them for perfor-
mance pay in all it complexities. Those thinking
of, or actually pursuing, performance pay need
information and training. For example, the authors
recently conducted a two-day workshop for key
administrators and teacher association leaders in a
large southwestern district. We reviewed the
design components of the various types of plans,
identified key design issues, and engaged in the
mock development of various plans using dis-
trict/teacher association design groups.
Implementing 
the Performance Pay Plan
It is necessary to distinguish the design of the
performance pay plan from its implementation.
Careful design does not guarantee successful
implementation. In our experience, the complexi-
ties and demands of implementation are vastly
underestimated, leading to serious problems of
on-the-ground management and teacher accep-
tance of the plan.  We believe there are four key
requirements for strong implementation:
1. Identification of a designated “champion”
and formal leader for the plan;
2.  Continual engagement by top management
with the plan;
3.  Attention to details and “drill down” of
plan requirements to all systems involved, to
avoid changing timelines and deadlines, modify-
ing the design midstream, and confusing teachers
and administrators; and
4. Constant communication with teachers and
principals (the Denver ProComp plan is exemplar
in this regard).
It is wise to develop implementation plans at
the same time as the performance pay plan itself is
designed. This will create a synergy that will help
create not only a better plan, but a better launch of
it.
Conduct a Pilot of the Performance Pay
Plan
Based on the above guidelines, it seems a fore-
gone conclusion that conducting a pilot of the pay
program is the preferred way to begin. This will
allow for capacity building and scaling up and
also will provide an opportunity for all affected to
learn about the actual system in practice. In turn,
the lessons learned from the pilot should be help-
ful in moving to full implementation and gaining
the teacher motivation and acceptance necessary
for the plan to be effective and to survive.
Looking Ahead
To date there have been very few states and
districts that have experimented with performance
pay plans for teachers, and even fewer that have
conducted systematic research on their effective-
ness. Our descriptions of those plans and the eval-
uation research results suggest a rather checkered
set of experiences and outcomes. Our guidelines
for practice, while based on a limited set of stud-
ies that used nonexperimental evaluation designs,
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can be extrapolated in the design and implementa-
tion of new plans in ways that will help them be
more effective than seems to be the case to date.  
There will be ample opportunities to apply
these guidelines as new attempts at performance
pay emerge. Arizona and Minnesota are encour-
aging districts to develop performance pay plans
and submit them to the state for review and possi-
ble funding. Florida is requiring districts to devel-
op performance pay plans under the new Special
Teachers Are Rewarded (STAR)  program. Texas
is implementing three related performance pay
plans under the Governor’s Educator Excellence
Award Program. The National Institute for Excel-
lence in Teaching’s Teacher Advancement Pro-
gram (TAP) has been expanding rapidly in indi-
vidual schools and districts. The federal govern-
ment’s Teacher Incentive Fund provides for exper-
imentation, with technical assistance and monitor-
ing, from an independent panel of experts. With
this new wave of plans, the performance pay plan
umbrella has opened wider to include new types
of plans not covered in this Brief. Most important
among these are plans that link pay increases or
bonuses to value-added measures of the achieve-
ment of the teacher’s students.
We think that all of the issues raised in our
guidelines for practice also will be relevant to
other types of teacher compensation innovations
not covered in this Brief. In hard-to-staff schools,
for example, will the hiring bonus be of sufficient
size, and will  working conditions improve
enough to make the school an attractive alterna-
tive for teachers to not only join but remain in? In
value-added plans, will teachers accept differenti-
ation based on test results? Will teachers have a
strong expectancy that their own efforts will lead
to gains in student learning? Will the bonuses be
well funded and sufficient in size? Will HR sys-
tems be realigned to support value-added perfor-
mance improvement? 
It will be important to systemically evaluate
the design and implementation of these new pay
plans. It will be important to evaluate multiple
outcomes, including student achievement, teacher
reaction, and cost effectiveness. It also will be
important to determine if the guidelines for prac-
tice presented in this Brief carry over into these
plans (as we hypothesize they will do), and to
develop new guidelines for practice specific to the
new plans.
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Appendix A.1. Research Findings on School-Based Performance Award Programs (SBPA)
Program Evaluation
SBPA in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Car-
olina; Kentucky; and Maryland 
SBPA in Dallas, Texas 
Research Findings
• SBPA create both positive (goal attainment, bonus, recognition,
increased learning for students and self) and negative (sanctions for
not meeting goals, increased stress) outcomes for teachers.
• Bonuses need to be large (3-5% of base salary) to be motivational.
• Fairness of SBPA goals, components, and procedures is critical to
teachers; constant communication about these with teachers is essen-
tial.
• The higher teachers’ expectancy that their efforts will result in the
school achieving its goals, the higher the subsequent school perfor-
mance.
• The SBPA must build in ways to increase teacher expectancy by pro-
viding performance enablers such as structured teacher collaboration,
focused principal leadership, target professional development, perfor-
mance feedback, and adequate district resources.
• Teacher turnover is higher in schools that do not meet their goals and
win bonuses.
• Compared to other Texas school districts without a SBPA, the Dallas pro-
gram increased pass rates on math and reading tests for seventh grade White
and Hispanic students, but not Black students.
• Compared to the other school districts, dropout rates declined more
in Dallas.
• Replacement turnover rates for principals increased during the SBPA
in both effective and ineffective schools.
Citations: Heneman, H. G. III (1998), Heneman, H. G. III, & Milanowski, A. (1998, 1999); Kelley, C., Conley, S., & Kimball, S.
(1999); Kelley, C., Heneman, H. G. III, & Milanowski, A. (2002); Kelley, C., Odden, A., & Heneman, H. G. III. (2000); Ladd, H.
(1999); Milanowski, A. (1999).
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Appendix A.2. Research Findings on Knowledge- and Skill-Based Pay
Program Evaluation
A. Competency Demonstration
Evaluation of the Douglas County, CO Plan
Evaluation of Tennessee’s Career Ladder
Evaluation System
B. Classroom Performance Mastery
Evaluation of the Standards-based teacher
evaluation systems in Cincinnati and
Washoe County (Reno/Sparks) and Vaughn
Charter School (Los Angeles)
Research Findings
• Understanding of the overall pay plan was higher among experienced
teachers.
• The Outstanding Teacher Award (based on a specially–prepared port-
folio) had mixed teacher reactions; major problem was burden of
portfolio preparation.
• Site responsibility pay was too little, with too much paperwork.
• Skill Block pay was strongly favored by teachers.
• The Group Incentive Plan (voluntary participation, school wide, site
derived objectives) was very popular and perceived as improving stu-
dent performance in middle and elementary schools; there was
declining teacher participation in high schools.
• A general pay formula that replaced the single salary schedule was
difficult to understand.
• Teachers randomly assigned to the system increased math, but not
reading, test scores.
• Evaluation ratings predicted value-added student achievement in
reading and math.
• Teachers accepted the teaching standards.
• Teacher reactions were mixed for evaluation evidence required, eval-
uator qualifications and motivation, rating accuracy and fairness,
feedback and improvement assistance from evaluator, the new sys-
tem as a whole.
• Administrators accept the teaching standards; reported increased
workload and paperwork in implementing new system; had difficul-
ties in providing sufficient feedback and coaching.
• Impacts on teaching practice were primarily on planning, classroom
management, and attention to state and district standards.
• There were numerous implementation glitches that were frustrating
to teachers and administrators.
• There was a lack of a broader strategy in the districts to seek and
drive teacher and student performance improvement.
• There was a lack of alignment of human resource systems (recruit-
ment, selection, induction, mentoring, professional development,
compensation, performance management, instructional leadership) to
the teaching standards.
• Teachers resisted linking the teaching evaluation results to pay.
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Program Evaluation
A Study of a performance pay plan in 
South Carolina (included teacher attendance,
professional development activities, rated
classroom performance, and student 
achievement)
C. National Board for Professional Teaching
Standards (NBPTS)
Evaluations of the relationship of NBPTS
certification and student achievement in
North Carolina and Miami 
Research Findings
• Teachers who received the performance bonus had higher classroom
average student achievement.
• Students of National Board Certified Teachers (NBCT’s) had higher
value-added achievement in reading and math than students of non
NBCT’s in two studies; a third study showed fewer and smaller posi-
tive effects. 
• The NBPTS program can be expensive (teacher preparation time,
cost of application, salary increases or bonuses for certification),
raising questions of its cost-effectiveness.
Citations: Cavalluzzo (2004); Cooper & Cohn, 1997; Dee, T., & Keys, B. (2004);  Hall, G., & Caffarella, E. (1997);  Heneman, H.
G. III, & Milanowski, A. (2004); Heneman, H. G. III, Milanowski, A., Kimball, S., & Odden, A. (2006);  Milanowski, A. (2003);
Milanowski, A., & Heneman, H. G. III, (2001); Odden, A., Kelley, C., Heneman, H. G. III, & Milanowski, A. (2001);  Goldhaber, D.,
& Anthony, E. (2004);  Vandervoort, L., Amrein-Beardsley, A., & Berliner, D. (2004);  Boyd, W., & Reese, J. (2006);  Saunders,
Ashton & Wright (2005).
Appendix A.2. (continued) Research Findings on Knowledge- and Skill-Based Pay
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Program Evaluation
Four-year pilot of the Denver ProComp pro-
gram in 16 schools, focusing on student
growth and the two annual learning objec-
tives
Research Findings
• Teachers at all school levels with higher quality learning objectives
had higher student achievement.
• The quality of the learning objectives increased over time, and the
percentage of teachers meeting them increased to over 90%.
• Teachers reported the following:
3 the pilot increased teachers’ focus on student achievement,
3 they used student achievement data more effectively,
3 changes in instruction were not due to the pilot,
3 they were less fearful of pay for performance,
3 there were continuing issues of fairness and trust, and
3 there were inconsistencies among principals in reviews 
of teachers.
• Linking student achievement data to specific teachers was 
challenging.
• There were major problems of alignment of instructional, assessment
data, professional development, and human resource systems.
Citations: Community Training and Assistance Center (2004).
Appendix A.3.  Research Findings on Combined Plans
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